LIGHTS, CAMERA, TRIAL: PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE OR THE EMMY?
The argument in favor of permitting the broadcast media' access to
the courtroom is based upon the idea that the right of the public to attend
courtroom trials,2 a right implicitly granted by the First Amendment, 3
extends to the admittance of the "thirteenth juror" 4-- the camera. While
the proponents of this argument correctly contend that the First Amendment protects the public's "right to know" 5 by allowing public access to
both criminal and civil' trials, this constitutional right does not require
that the broadcast media be given access to the courtroom. 7 Although the

At all times within this Comment the "broadcast media," unless otherwise specified, refers to the segment of the media that provides live television coverage..
2 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (holding
that the right of the public to attend criminal trials is guaranteed by the First Amendment).
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. I, which provides:

"Congress shall make no law re-

specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
4 See Kathleen M. Krygier, Comment, The Thirteenth Juror: Electronic Media's
Struggle to Enter State and Federal Courtrooms, .3 CoMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 71, 83
(1995) (arguing that a camera present in a courtroom becomes a "thirteenth juror," and
thus ensures the administration of justice); see also Roger Cossack, Wha You See Is Not
Always What You Get: Thoughts on the O.J. Trial and the Camera, 14 J. MARsHALL J.
COMPuTER & INFO. L. 555, 559 (1996) (proffering that the camera in the O.J. Simpson
murder trial allowed home viewers to each become a "thirteenth juror").
5 See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 580. The basis for the public's right to know argument
is that the First Amendment assures that public discussion of governmental affairs is informed and free of unnecessary restraints on access to information held by the government. See id. at 575-76. If freedom of speech is to be meaningful, the government may
not control or restrict the flow of information to the public unnecessarily. See id. Although the right of access to criminal trials is not explicitly mentioned in the First
Amendment, see id. at 579, it is deemed to be implicitly granted so that the public is able
to exercise fully other fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech and of the press,
which are explicitly enumerated in the Constitution. See id. at 576-77.
6 See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding
that the public has a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings); Westmoreland
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (agreeing with Publicker
that there is a right of access to civil proceedings under the First Amendment); see also
Richmond, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 (noting that civil trials historically have been presumptively open to the public).
7 See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978)
(concluding that "the guarantee of a public trial . . confers no special benefit on the
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United States Supreme Court recognized that individual states may allow
camera access to its courtrooms under certain conditions, the Court did
not endorse camera access! Rather, the Supreme Court found no constitutional basis for an absolute ban on camera access to the courtroom. 9
Today, a great discrepancy exists between camera access at the state
level and camera access at the federal level.' Presently, forty-seven
states permit camera access of some kind." Conversely, the federal
press") (citation omitted). Moreover, it is clear that the right to attend a trial does not
necessarily mean that there is a right to watch it on television. See id. (finding that "there
is no constitutional right" of the public to have any part of a trial broadcast live); Westmoreland, 752 F.2d at 23 (proffering that the Cable News Network (CNN) had no right
to televise a trial even where both the plaintiff and the defendant had consented to the
broadcast because Supreme Court precedent "articulate[s] a right to attend trials, not a
right to view them on a television screen"); United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278,
1280 (11th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the media's "tortured reading" of Supreme Court access
cases and contending that "just because television coverage is not constitutionally prohibited does not mean that television coverage is constitutionally mandated").
8 See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 582 (1981). In permitting the states to al-

low cameras in their courtrooms, the Chandler Court relied heavily on the fact that the
Florida system at issue had in place "safeguards" protecting a defendant from prejudice
and allowing a defendant the opportunity to object to the broadcast. See id. at 576-77.
Moreover, the Court noted that the guidelines promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court
specified the type of equipment that could be used at the trial as well as the manner in
which it could be used. See id. at 566. The Florida guidelines specified that: (1) only

one camera and one camera operator are allowed in the courtroom; (2) the media is required to share coverage when more than one organization seeks trial coverage; (3) artificial lighting is not allowed; (4) the media equipment must remain in a fixed location and
not be moved during the trial; (5) videotaping equipment must be stationed away from the
tribunal; (6) the changing of film, videotape, and lenses is prohibited while court is in
session; (7) the conferences between lawyers, lawyers and clients, and lawyers and the
judge are not allowed to be recorded; (8) the judge has the sole discretion to exclude media coverage of certain witnesses; and (9) filming the jury is prohibited. See id. In addition, the Florida rules provided that a judge may forbid camera coverage if convinced
such coverage will injure a defendant's right to a fair trial. See id.
9 See id. at 582. The Court so held because no definitive proof could be found that
the defendant's right to a fair trial had been compromised. See id. Hence, the Court
found that it could not interfere with the state's decision to allow camera access absent a
showing of prejudice to a defendant. See id. at 582-83; see also Westmoreland, 752 F.2d
at 21 (finding that although the Chandler Court did not hold that states are precluded from
experimenting with televised proceedings, the Court "nevertheless did not endow the media with substantive rights qua media").
10 See Krygier, supra note 4, at 81-82 (discussing the discrepancy between state and
federal court access rules and arguing for greater access in federal trial courts). This disparity is narrowing as a result of the March 1996 decision of the United States Judicial
Conference to allow cameras in the federal courts at the appellate level. See infra note 12
for discussion of the Judicial Conference's decision.
m See Todd Piccus, Comment, Demysting the Least Understood Branch: Opening
the Supreme Court to BroadcastMedia, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1053, 1064 (1993). Today,
three states, Indiana, Mississippi, and South Dakota, in addition to the District of Colum-

bia, do not allow broadcast media access to their courtrooms. See id. n.63; see also
Saundra Torry, In Some Courtrooms, Check Those Cameras at the Door, WASH. POST,
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courts have held steadfast and have resisted the admittance of the camera,
at least at the trial level. 2 The notorious trials of Orenthal James (O.J.)
Simpson,13 Susan Smith,14 Richard Allen Davis, 5 Timothy McVeigh, 6
Oct. 23, 1995, (Wash. Bus.), at 7 (listing states that do not allow camera access). After
the Supreme Court's decision in Chandler, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, Texas, Vermont, and Wyoming
permitted the broadcast media access to their courtrooms on a permanent basis. See Piccus, supra, at 1063 & n.58. Other states authorized the use of the camera in their courtrooms on an experimental basis after Chandler. See id. at 1063 & n.59.
12 See Joan Biskupic, A New Eye on Federal Courts: Committee Votes to Permit
Cameras inAppeals Hearings, WASH. POST, March 13, 1996, at A12. The Judicial Conference, headed by United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Rehnquist, voted 14 to 12
to allow cameras in the federal courts at the appellate level. See id. The members of the
Conference voiced their opposition to camera access at the trial level. See id. Hence, the
federal court system continues to ban cameras from the courtroom at the trial level. See
id.
Recently, however, certain circuits have accepted the invitation from the Judicial
Conference and now allow the broadcast media access to appellate proceedings. See Joe
Gyan Jr., N.O. Court Bans All Cameras, Tape Recorders in Courtrooms, SUN. ADVOC.
(Baton Rouge) Oct. 27, 1996, at 3B. Following the decision by the Judicial Conference
the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit instituted experimental pilot programs, while
most other federal appeal courts, such as the Fifth Circuit, have chosen to continue a
closed-door policy. See id. The decision by the Judicial Conference to allow cameras at
the federal appellate level is recognized as a "small but significant step" towards allowing
camera access generally to the federal courts. See Biskupic, supra, at A12; see also
Linda Greenhouse, Reversing Course, Judicial Panel Allows Television in Appeals
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1996, at A13.
13 See Christine Spolar, Judge Keeps Camera For Simpson Trial: Ito Says He Will
Decide on Coverage of PretrialHearings on a Case-by-CaseBasis, WASH. POST, Nov. 8,
1994, at A14 (reporting Judge Lance Ito's belief that the one stationary camera would not
jeopardize O.J. Simpson's right to a fair trial); Torry, supra note 11, at 7 (contending that
the O.J. trial "stoked the debate" on the constitutionality of cameras in the courtroom).
Interestingly, Judge Ito made the decision to permit camera access even though he had
received 12,500 letters from citizens who "wanted the plug pulled" verses 800 letters
from citizens who favored camera coverage. See Spolar, supra, at A14.
For purposes of this Comment, People v. OrenthalJames Simpson, the criminal trial
of O.J. Simpson, will hereinafter be referred to as the "O.J. trial," and should not be
confused with the subsequent civil trial that was not televised.
14 See TV Barred in Drowning Case, WASH. POST, July 1, 1995, at A2 (relaying
Judge William Howard's contention that any broadcast of the trial of Susan Smith for the
murder of her two sons would interfere with due process and pose a risk to the trial proceedings in general).
15 See Jill Smolowe, TV Cameras on TriaL" The Unseemly Simpson Spectacle Provokes a Backlash Against Televised Court Proceedings, TIME, July 24, 1995, at 38
(reporting Superior Court Judge Lawrence Antolini's vow that "[n]othing like the O.J.
Simpson case is going to happen in my courtroom" during the trial of Davis for the alleged abduction and murder of Polly Klaas).
16 See Victims Can Watch Okla. Trial on TV, STAR LEDGER, July 16, 1996, at 4.
United States District Court Judge Richard Matsch decided to permit closed-circuit television coverage of the trial of Nichols and McVeigh for the bombing of Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma in 1996, defending this access by noting that it was the only way in which victims and friends could view the trial. See id. The trial was televised from Judge
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Jesse Timmendequas, 7 and Theodore Kaczynsk 8 have sparked serious
debate among scholars, lawyers, judges, and the broadcast media on the
issue of access and the discrepancy between the federal and state courts.
Part I of this Comment sets forth the history of camera access to the
courtroom and outlines the current state of such access at the state and
federal levels. Part II highlights the possible repercussions and impacts
of the camera on various courtroom participants. Part III addresses the
argument that camera access is an issue of First Amendment concern and
posits that the public's right to know is adequately protected by current
day media coverage without the intrusion of the camera. Finally, Part IV
concludes that the faults of the present day system allow litigants to suffer potential undue injury because of the imposition of the camera.
I.

THE STATUS OF CAMERA

ACCESS TO STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
TODAY

There are only three states that do not allow some form of camera
access to the courtroom.19 The majority of the states that allow camera
Matsch's courtroom in Denver, Colorado and shown in a courtroom in Oklahoma City.
See id.
The judge's decision came as a response to an anti-terrorism bill enacted in April
1996. See id. The law mandates closed-circuit coverage of trials in federal courts that
have been moved in excess of 350 miles so that victims and survivors may follow the
proceedings. See id. This law was passed by Congress after Judge Matsch had the
venue changed for the trial from Oklahoma City to Denver, a considerable distance for
interested parties to have to travel in order to view the proceedings. See id. Defense attorneys opposed the admission of the camera, contending that the law passed by Congress
was unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers doctrine by instructing
the judiciary on camera coverage. See id. The judge rejected this constitutional argument, but acknowledged counsel's assertion that the camera might be disruptive. See id.
As such, only one camera, unattended by a cameraman, was permitted at the trial. See
id. The camera was mounted in a single place with the judge maintaining the ability to
turn it off by a control mechanism within his reach. See id.; see also Limited TVfor
Bombing Trial, WASH. POST, July 16, 1996, at A2.
17 See Tom Hester, Judge Limits TV at Trial in Megan Murder, STAR LEDGER, Mar.
8, 1997, at 1. Superior Court Judge Andrew B. Hamilton, after "intense consideration,"
decided to ban gavel to gavel coverage of the trial of Jesse Timmendequas, and allow
Court TV to film only the opening and closing statements by the attorneys and the reading
of the verdict. See id. Timmendequas was charged with the murder of Megan Kanka,
whose death spurred the passage of a sex offender notification law commonly known as
"Megan's Law." See id.
's See Unabom Trial Won't Be Made for TV, STAR LEDGER, July 5, 1996, at 3
(reporting that the trial of Kaczynski, the alleged "Unabomber," will not be televised,
because United States District Judge Garland E. Burrell is expected to keep a tight hold
on the case, thus confirming commentators' opinions that federal judges are known to
refuse to allow their courtrooms to be run by cameras).
19 See supra note I I and accompanying text. Only three states ban the camera from
their courtrooms:
(1) Indiana
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A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking
photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may
authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation
of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes
of judicial administration;
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings;
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of appropriate court proceedings under the following conditions:
(i) the means of recording will not distract participants or
impair the dignity of the proceedings;
(ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or recorded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the recording and reproduction;
(iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceeding has been concluded and all direct appeals have been
exhausted; and
(iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional
purposes in educational institutions.
IND. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(13) (West 1996).
(2) Mississippi
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking
photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may
authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation
of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes
of judicial administration;
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings;
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of appropriate court proceedings under the following conditions:
(i) the means of recording will not distract participants or
impair the dignity of the proceedings;
(ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or recorded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the recording and reproduction;
(iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceeding has been concluded and all direct appeals have been
exhausted; and
(iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional
purposes in educational institutions.
MISS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)(7) (West 1996).
(3) South Dakota
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking
photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may
authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation
of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes
of judicial administration;
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access do, however, impose specific limitations on such access. 2' As a
perceived "backlash" to the O.J. trial,2 1 many of these states reconsid(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings;
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of
appropriate court proceedings under the following conditions:
(i) the means of recording will not distract participants or
impair the dignity of the proceedings;
(ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or recorded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the recording and reproduction;
(iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceeding has been concluded and all direct appeals have been
exhausted; and
(iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional
purposes in educational institutions.
S.D. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(12) (Michic 1995).
The highest courts of the states resisting the admittance of the camera have consistently upheld the ban as being constitutionally sound, even in the face of media pressure.
See Brown v. State, 546 N.E.2d 839, 842 (Ind. 1989) (denying defendant's request for
broadcast coverage of his trial because Indiana's Canon 3(A)(7) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct prohibits a judge from allowing recording, television, or photography in the
courtroom); Associated Press v. Bost, 656 So. 2d 113, 114, 117 (Miss. 1995) (holding
that there is "no constitutional right to have testimony recorded and broadcast" and contending that the camera will continue to be banned until the "benefits and ramifications"
of its presence have been extensively researched). To date, the media has not challenged
the rule of South Dakota severely limiting camera access.
2 See Torry, supra note 11, at 7. Although forty-seven states permit access, only
twenty-three of those states do not have specific limitations and allow "routine" coverage.
See id.
Conversely, most states impose certain restrictions. See id. For example,
Maryland allows cameras in civil and appellate proceedings but not in criminal proceedings. See id.; MD. CODE ANN., Crimes and Punishments § 467B (1996) (prohibiting extended camera coverage of criminal proceedings in the trial courts).
Moreover, Virginia allows the camera to view both civil and criminal proceedings,
but takes care to bar the medium from all proceedings involving sex offenses or issues of
a sensitive nature. See Torry, supra note 11, at 7; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266
(Michie 1995), which provides that
A court may solely in its discretion permit the taking of photographs in the
courtroom during the process of judicial proceedings and the broadcasting
ofjudicial proceedings by radio or television and the use of electronic or
photographic means for the perpetuation of the record of parts thereof in
criminal and in civil cases, but only in accordance with the rules set forth
hereunder.
1. The presiding judge shall at all times have authority to prohibit, interrupt
or terminate electronic media and still photography coverage of public judicial proceedings. The presiding judge shall advise the parties of such
coverage in advance of the proceedings and shall allow the parties to object
thereto. For good cause shown, the presiding judge may prohibit coverage
in any case and may restrict coverage as he deems appropriate to meet the
ends of justice.
2. Coverage of the following types of judicial proceedings shall be prohibited: adoption proceedings, juvenile proceedings, child custody proceedings, divorce proceedings, temporary and permanent spousal support pro-
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ered the issue and called for either a ban on the camera or, at a minimum, stricter regulation.' Other states seemingly question whether the
O.J. trial had any impact on the issue of camera access at all.'
ceedings, proceedings concerning sexual offenses, proceedings for the
hearing of motions to suppress evidence, proceedings involving trade secrets, and in camera proceedings.
3. Coverage of the following categories of witnesses shall be prohibited:
police informants, minors, undercover agents and victims and families of
victims of sexual offenses.
4. Coverage of jurors shall be prohibited expressly at any stage of a judicial proceeding, including that portion of a proceeding during which a jury
is selected. The judge shall inform all potential jurors at the beginning of
the jury selection process of this prohibition.
5. To protect the attorney-client privilege and the right to counsel, there
shall be no recording or broadcast of sound from such conferences which
occur in a court facility between attorneys and their clients, between cocounsel of a client, between adverse counsel, or between counsel and the
presiding judge held at the bench or in chambers.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266 (Michie 1995).
21 See Smolowe, supra note 15, at 38 (noting that the "backlash" against cameras in
the courtroom has less to do with constitutional concerns and more to do with the real
consequences of the Simpson case, including "the media stalking of witnesses, the glut of
pop books, [and] the glamorization of commentators"); Torry, supra note 11, at 7
(discussing that as a "backlash" to the OJ.trial other judges have closed their courtroom
doors to notable proceedings). But see Ted Gest, Revolution? We're Still Waiting, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 23, 1996, at 78 (arguing that any "revolution" has yet to
arrive, but noting that certain minor changes in the law have been observed since the boginning of the OJ.trial, namely: (1) the new California law allowing the admission of
certain hearsay evidence, such as the diaries of Nicole Brown Simpson, which would, in
the past, have been excluded; (2) the ABA's implementation of a "mentor team" for those
participants involved in high visibility trials; and (3) the new caution exercised by judges
involved in televised trials); James C. Goodale, Cameras, the Courts and the Missing
'Simpson' Backlash, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 2, 1996, at 3 (arguing that the OJ.trial did not result in a "backlash" to the system because the case would have been a media circus regardless of the presence of the camera); Marla Hart, CI. TR., You, the Jury: Court TV
Brings the Courtroom Home, Aug. 4, 1996, at 5 (relaying assertion of Steven Brill, founder of Court TV, that the expected "backlash" of the OJ.trial only lasted a few weeks
and courtroom cameras are here to stay).
2 See, e.g., Maura Dolan, State Panel Puts PartialBan on Court Cameras, L.A.
TIMES, May 18, 1996, at 1. Although the judicial council for the State of California rejected a broad ban on the camera, it approved a new rule forbidding the camera to broadcast jury selection, courtroom spectators, sidebar conferences, or discussion by attorneys
and clients at counsel tables. See id. The new rule also requires a judge to consider a
number of factors when deciding whether to permit television broadcast of a trial, including "the security and dignity of the court, the importance of promoting public access
to the judicial system, the privacy rights of participants and the potential impact on the
jury." Id. The council's decision to restrict the camera quashed an earlier measure endorsed in April 1996 by the governing board of the State Bar of California granting
judges the discretion to permit cameras in their courtrooms, citing as a defense a belief
that the public has a right to know the business of the courts. See Ken Hoover, Klass
Case Puts Focus on Camera Ban, S.F. CHRoN., Apr. 22, 1996, at A17. The new rule
would seemingly have changed the way the OJ.trial was broadcast, because the televised
reactions of the relatives of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman to various
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The federal courts, conversely, have consistently contended that the
right to attend a trial and report its contents is distinguishable from the
right of the press to broadcast the actual proceedings.' Therefore, the
federal courts have not prompted Congress to amend the federal rule that
prohibits photography during court proceedings.' The authority for the
federal courts' position is readily traceable to Supreme Court decisions
that have interpreted the constitutional right of access somewhat narpieces of evidence and the whispered discussions between OJ. and his attorneys would
today be prohibited. See id.; Shelley Emling, Bill Will Let Judges Bar Cameras,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 16, 1996, at C5. The Georgia Senate unanimously passed
legislation in March 1996 that allows a judge to ban cameras from his or her courtroom.
See id. The new bill requires a judge to consider certain factors before allowing the
broadcast media access, including the impact on due process, the integrity of the court,

and any objections voiced by lawyers and witnesses on either side. See id. Following the
rule of many other states, cameras had previously been allowed in Georgia state courts
unless there was a "compelling" reason to ban them. See id.; see also Stephen A. Metz,
Comment, Justice Through the Eye of a Camera: Cameras in the Courtrooms in the
United States, Canada, England and Scotland, 14 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 673, 695 (1996)
(noting that as a direct result of the O.J. trial the California Supreme Court enacted a new
rule of professional conduct, which imposes substantial penalties upon any lawyer who
makes a public statement about a proceeding in which the attorney is participating or has
participated when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that there is a substantial
likelihood of the statement materially prejudicing the proceeding).
23 See S.L. Alexander, The Impact of California v. Simpson on Cameras in the
Courtroom, 79 JUDICATURE 169 (1996). Two days after the reading of the Simpson verdict surveys were sent out to individuals in all states, Washington, D.C., and Guam who
the Society of Professional Journalists listed as voluntary local experts on media access.
See id. at 169-70. The surveyed group included lawyers, reporters, and editors. See id.
at 169. The survey contained the following three questions designed to determine the impact of the O.J. trial:
1) As of this date, do you know of any change in the status of courtroom
camera usage in your state since November 1994?
2) As of this date, do you know of any activity (i.e., bills introduced in
legislature, statements by members of bar or judiciary) suggesting there
may soon be a change in status of courtroom camera usage in your state?
3) Do you feel camera coverage of California v. Simpson has had any effect on the status of courtroom camera usage in your state?
Id. at 170.
New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, states that were considering extending
allowable camera coverage, all reported that there was no substantial impact from the
case. See id. at 171; Gest, supra note 21, at 78 (highlighting states that have sustained no
impact from the O.J. trial).
24 See Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984)
(contending that it is a "long leap ... between a public right under the First Amendment
to attend trials and a public right under the First Amendment to see a given trial televised"); United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 1983) (promulgating
that the press "misconceives" the right of access when it argues that this right extends to

televising trials).
2S See FED. R. CRIM. P. 53 (providing that "the taking of photographs in the court
room during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the court room shall not be permitted by the court").
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rowly, holding that there is no guaranteed right of the media to televise

trials.' The Court's posture rests on the theory that the prohibition of
the camera neither inhibits the press from reporting events nor prevents
the public from receiving information because the dissemination of the
news is readily accomplished through alternative media efforts.'

Despite the Supreme Court findings on the matter, the demand for
camera access to federal judicial proceedings has nonetheless continued.
In March 1996, the Judicial Conference of the United States' (the Judicial Conference) relented somewhat to the pressures of the media in deciding that a federal appellate judge may allow camera access to the federal courtroom at his or her discretion." This decision reversed a longstanding rule unequivocally barring the camera from the federal courtroom.' The access, however, is severely limited; only federal appellate
26 See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978) (finding
that the right to a public trial is satisfied by the ability of the press and public to attend
and report trial observations without resort to live broadcast); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 589 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (acknowledging the educational value of television but contending that the argument lacks constitutional dimension because the "rights
to print and speak ...do not embody an independent right to bring the mechanical facilities of the broadcasting ...into the courtroom").
27 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia , 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1980)
(holding that the media, in its role as "surrogate" for the public, adequately protects the
public's right of access).
28 See Anton R. Valukas et al., Cameras in the Courtroom: An Overview, 13 COMM.
LAW. 1, 19 & n.15 (1995). The Judicial Conference of the United States is the rulemaking body for the federal court system, less the Supreme Court. See id. The Judicial Conference is headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist and comprised of
26 appellate and district court judges. See id.
2
See Biskupic, supra note 12, at A12; Greenhouse, supra note 12, at A13; see also
Gail Diane Cox, Lights! Camera!Justice? TV Changed Politics and Football. What Will
It Do to Our System ofJustice?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 29, 1996, at Al (discussing the decided
turn of the federal courts from the absolute ban on the camera and predicting possible repercussions to a society in which all trials may be televised). The author predicts that
networks may use trials as a form of cheap programming with many opportunities for
commercial breaks. See id. at A21. Additionally, the author opines that there may be a
"dumbing down" or "popularization" of legal jargon as newscasters subconsciously conform their speech to that of their viewers. See id.
30 See Henry J. Reske, No More Cameras in Federal Courts, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994,
at 28. In September 1994 the Judicial Conference voted two to one to reinstate the prohibition of the broadcast media from all civil cases in federal court and voted unanimously
to continue to ban the media from all criminal cases in federal court. See id. The decision came after the Judicial Conference had addressed the number of challenges made by
the media to the closed-door policy of the federal courts by instituting an experimental
pilot program allowing cameras in federal courts during civil trials. See id. A three-year
experiment was conducted, and a survey was subsequently taken in an attempt to determine what affect, if any, the camera had on the participants in the courtroom. See id.
The results of the study seemed to indicate that the presence of the camera had little or no
effect upon the trial participants. See id. The Judicial Conference, however, voted to
uphold the ban on the camera. See id. In support of its decision, the Judicial Conference
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judges, and not federal trial judges, have the discretion to admit the camera.3 ' The reaction of the federal courts to the Judicial Conference's decision to allow appellate courts to permit broadcast media access has
varied, with some circuits choosing not to exercise the option and others
welcoming the change. 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has gone to the extreme and permitted the televising of
trials in the federal civil courts in New York.3 This defied the call from
the Judicial Conference for federal appellate courts to annul any local
state rules permitting camera coverage at the federal trial level.' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the appellate trib-

highlighted potential negative effects that the camera may have upon jurors and witnesses.
See id. Indeed, the survey results indicated that 37% of judges questioned believed that
witnesses were made nervous by the camera to some extent. See id. Hence, the Judicial
Conference was concerned that even if only a minimum number of participants were affected, a defendant's right to a fair trial could be compromised. See id. Therefore, the
Judicial Conference did not approve an amendment to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which would have allowed for camera access in the courtroom under
guidelines to be promulgated by the Judicial Conference. See id.
31 See supra note 12 for a discussion of camera access at the federal appellate level.
32 See Gyan, supra note 12, at 3B. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit formally initiated a total ban on television cameras, as well as still photography
and tape recorders. See id. The First, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have also
declined the invitation by the Judicial Conference to allow the media access in this fashion. See id. The Second and Ninth Circuits, which were the only appellate courts to take
part in the pilot program conducted by the Judicial Conference, have approved a rule
permitting cameras in certain cases. See id.
33 See infra note 34.
34 See Deborah Pines, Circuit Council Leaves Camera Rule Intact, N.Y. L.J., June
14, 1996, at 1. Two federal judges sitting in New York construed a local rule to allow
cameras in their courtrooms at the trial level. See id. The Second Circuit, however, took
no steps to disturb or amend the local New York rule that allowed for such construction.
See id. That rule, local Rule 7, had been interpreted by Judge Robert Ward of the United
States District Court for the Southern District as allowing camera access into his courtroom. See id. at 4; Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 660, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(permitting televising of oral arguments under New York local Rule 7). Judge Robert W.
Sweet, also of the Southern District, followed the lead of Judge Ward, and construed local Rule 7 to permit camera coverage of arguments in a proposed class-action suit against
Victoria's Secret Catalogue. See Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalog, 923 F. Supp.
580, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Deborah Pines, TV Cameras Allowed in U.S. Court, N.Y.
L.J., May 1, 1996, at 1 (reporting Judge Sweet's contention that "[tiwelve years after the
Westmoreland decision and twenty-two years after the Estes holding" advances in technology preclude a continued bar to the "presumptive First Amendment right" to view
televised trials). Other New York judges have followed suit, yet the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has remained silent on the issue. See Hamilton v.
Accu-Tek, 942 F. Supp. 136, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing the Judicial Conference's resolution but nonetheless agreeing with the holdings of Marisol and Katzman that
the Conference's authority is only persuasive and New York local Rule 7 controls); Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 937 F. Supp. 335, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same).
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une that hears appeals from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, is still considering the matter.'
A. ConstitutionalHistory
Two seminal cases, Estes v. Texas' and Chandler v. Florida,3' outline the controversy surrounding, and the basis for permitting, camera
access to the courtroom. In Estes, the Supreme Court held that televising
the trial deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to due process.' Sixteen years later, however, the Chandler Court decided that its
decision in Estes did not mandate an absolute ban on camera access."
Because concrete evidence of prejudice to the defendant attributable to
the presence of the camera was lacking, the Chandler Court held that the
state's camera access program passed constitutional muster.' ° Accordingly, since the decision in Chandler, many states have instituted various
programs allowing some form of camera access to their courtrooms."
1. Estes v. Texas
The Estes Court balanced a defendant's right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment' 2 against the public's right to

35 See Rocco Cammarere, Cameras in Courtrooms? No, by Narrow Margin, 5 N.J.
LAW. 831 (1996). A survey taken of 116 New Jersey trial attorneys revealed that 53.5%

voted against the presence of the camera in the courtroom. See id. Further, as a result of
the "furor" of the O.J. trial, New Jersey state courts are taking a second look at allowing
cameras into their courtrooms, even though cameras have been permitted since 1986.
See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which hears appeals
from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, is undecided on the
question of access. See id.
'6 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
The defendant in Estes was indicted by a grand jury on
charges of "swindling" as a result of his fraudulent attempt to induce several farmers to
purchase fictitious property. See id. at 534 & n.1. During the two day pre-trial hearing
on the defendant's motion to close the courtroom to the press, "massive publicity" occurred, amounting to more than 10 volumes of newspaper articles. See id. at 535. The
hearing was carried by live television and radio coverage, involving 12 cameramen and
causing "considerable disruption." See id. at 536. During the defendant's actual trial,
however, the camera was confined to a booth located in the back of the courtroom. See
id. at 537.
37 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
38 See Fstes, 381 U.S. at 535.
3
See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 574.
40 See id. at 582-83.
41 See Piccus, supra note 11, at 1063 & n.58 (listing states that have enacted rules
allowing camera access at some level since the Chandler decision).
42 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State.
. . o.

Id.
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know under the First Amendment.' The Court found that a defendant's
right to a trial unprejudiced by a camera outweighed the competing interest of the public in viewing a broadcast courtroom proceeding." Writing
for the majority, Justice Clark determined that the press, through its role
as representative of the public, fully protected the public's right to know
guaranteed by the First Amendment.' Although the Court conceded that
the press had been a great "catalyst" in motivating public interest in governmental affairs and exposing corruption, the majority held that freedom
of the press was not absolute.' Thus, the Court opined that the extent of
freedom afforded the press must be subject to overriding considerations
of fairness in judicial procedure.47
2.

Chandler v. Florida

After Estes, the issue of camera access to the courtroom remained
relatively dormant until 1981 when the Supreme Court revisited the issue
in Chandler v. Florida." Because the Chandler decision is hailed by

many camera advocates as endorsing the presence of the camera,49 it is
important to note that although the Supreme Court confirmed that the
public holds a constitutional right of access to trials, the Court noted that
the right does not mandate the admittance of the camera.'
In addressing the question of whether cameras should be banned, the
ChandlerCourt noted that the "task would be simple" if the camera conclusively affected the conduct of the parties so as to injure a defendant's
right to a fair trial."' Highlighting that the only empirical evidence ana-

lyzing the impact was "limited" and "nonscientific," 52 the Court found

4 See U.S. CONST. amend. I, which provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id. See also Estes, 381
U.S. at 539.
4 See id. at 544-45. The Court focused on the fact that the guarantee of a public trial
under the Sixth Amendment was a guarantee for the benefit of the defendant, not the public. See id. at 538. Additionally, the Court found that there was no right under the
United States Constitution that required that courtroom proceedings to be televised. See
id. at 540.
' See id. at 541-42.
4 See id. at 539.
47 See id.
, 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
49 See Piccus, supra note 11, at 1063.
M See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 574; see also Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,
435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978) (dismissing the argument that there is a constitutional right to
view televised court proceedings).
51 See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 575.
52 See id. at 576 n.11.
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that the "general issue of the psychological impact of broadcast coverage
upon the participants in a trial... is still a subject of sharp debate." 3
The Court noted, however, the absence of any unimpeachable empirical
data supporting the argument that the camera adversely impacts a defendant's right to a fair trial.' Conversely, the Court acknowledged that
Florida, the state in which Chandler was tried, had established certain
safeguards and guidelines to protect a defendant from possible prejudice.55 Therefore, the Court concluded that the Florida program did not
offend the Constitution because none of the evils and dangers feared by
the Estes Court existed.'
3.

Significance of Estes and Chandler today

The Supreme Court found the camera acceptable in the Chandler

case because the publicity surrounding the trial did not rise to the level of
what the Court termed a "Yankee Stadium" atmosphere. 57 Camera pro-

Id. at 578.
See id. at 576 n.11.
55 See id. at 566, 576-77; supra note 8 (listing the guidelines implemented at that time
by the Florida courts).
M See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 582-83. The Court noted the Estes Court's concern that
the presence of the camera would create a "Yankee Stadium" atmosphere in the courtroom as well as expose the jury to "sensational" coverage but found no such atmosphere
in the case at bar. See id. at 582.
57 See id. Conversely, the Court found that the notoriety suffered by the defendant in
Estes because of the broadcast media was a violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 534-35.
Notably, before this time, camera and radio access had been banned entirely as a result of the trial of Bruno Hauptmann in 1935 for the kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby.
See State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809 (N.J. 1935). Hauptmann was convicted of first degree murder. See id. at 813. The trial, however, through the use of radio, was broadcast
and therefore gained "spectacular publicity." See id. at 828. Consequently, after the
trial the A.B.A. evaluated the presence of the camera and its impact in the courtroom,
and accordingly drafted Canon 35, later to be amended to Canon 3A(7), which banned
both photographing and broadcasting in the courtroom. See Valukas, supra note 28, at
18. See generally Ruth Ann Strickland & Richter H. Moore, Jr., Cameras in State
Courts: A Historical Perspective, 78 JUDICATURE 128, 130 (1994) (discussing the evolution of Canon 35). The bar association of each state enacted its own version of the
A.B.A.'s model Canon 3A(7). See David Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV,
Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35
ARIZ. L. REV. 785, 799 n.110 (1993); infra note 62 (quoting entire text of Canon 3A(7)).
The Florida rule at issue in Chandler, set forth below, reflected a liberal interpretation of
Canon 3A(7):
Subject at all times to the authority of the presiding judge to (I) control the
conduct of proceedings before the court, (ii) ensure decorum and prevent
distractions, and (iii) ensure the fair administration of justice in the pending
cause, electronic media and still photography coverage of public judicial
proceedings in the appellate and trial courts of this state shall be allowed in
51
-
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ponents, however, seemingly view the Chandler decision as giving a
"green light" to cameras at the state court level, provided there are cer-

tain safeguards to protect a defendant's rights.5' Ironically, the Chandler
opinion is instead more helpful to an argument opposing admittance of
the camera in certain circumstances today." In the opinion, the Court
specifically noted that whether television coverage of future trials would
result in a "barbaric perversion of decent justice" was a question that

was yet to be determined.' As such, the Court concluded that, keeping
in mind the evolutionary nature of state experimentation, a risk of prejudice to any defendant always exists and should be ascertained on a case-

by-case basis. 6' Today, the varying access rules among state courts, exacerbated by the media's prerogative to televise proceedings selectively,

ignore the Chandler Court's concern regarding appropriate court decorum, and thus pose a significant risk of prejudice to any defendant in
court.
B. State Access Rules
Most states have adopted or incorporated into their court rules
Canon 3 of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct,' which allows a judge in
accordance with standards of conduct and technology promulgated by the
Supreme Court of Florida.
In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 781 (Fla, 1979).
Notably, the present version of A.B.A. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3 omits any discussion of the camera in the court. See infra note 62 for further discussion of the latest
version of Canon 3.
58 See Piccus, supra note 11, at 1063 & nn.58 & 59 (listing number of states that implemented either permanent or experimental programs permitting camera access after the
Chandlerdecision).
"' See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 582 (finding camera access constitutional as it did not
instigate the type of "circus" environment feared by the Estes Court); Paul Gewirtz, Vitims & Voyeurs at the Criminal Trial, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 863, 886 (1995) (contending
that the OJ. trial exhibited the essence of a "circus," or gaudy, public entertainment);
Charles Musser, Film Truth, Documentary and the Law: Justice at the Margins, 30
U.S.F. L. REV. 963, 984 (1996) (arguing that the O.J. trial was transformed by the media
into a "circus"); Gerald F. Uelman, The Trial as a Circus: Inherit the Wind, 30 U.S.F.
L. REV. 1221, 1222 (1996) (discussing the camera's capacity to tempt trial participants to
play to it and consequently turn the trial into a "circus"); Michael Gartner, O.J. Circus?
Blame TV, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 1995, at 11A; Steven Keeva, Circus-Like Trial Colors
Expectation, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 48C.
6 See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 580-81.
61 See id. at 582
62 See supra note 57 for a brief history of Canon 3. Canon 3A(7) of the 1972 version
of the ABA Code prohibited the presence of the camera, and was amended in 1982 to
permit camera access as follows:
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording or photographing in courtrooms and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court, or recesses between sessions, except that under rules prescribed by a supervising appellate court or other appropriate authority, a
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his or her discretion to permit the broadcast of a courtroom proceeding.'
The amount of discretion permitted by a presiding judge varies for each

state, as do the restrictions that each state court employs." Some state
courts allow a participant to object to the presence of the camera at the
proceeding, but reserve the ultimate decision regarding access to the
judge's discretion.' A minority of state courts find that any objection to
the camera by the defendant is sufficient cause for its exclusion.' Other
state courts, conversely, impose a high evidentiary burden on a defendant, requiring a demonstration of actual harm before barring the broadjudge may authorize broadcasting, televising, recording or photographing
of judicial proceedings in courtrooma and areas immediately adjacent
thereto consistent with the right of the parties to a fair trial and subject to
express conditions, limitations, and guidelines which allow such coverage
in a manner that will be unobtrusive, will not distract the trial participants,
and will not otherwise interfere with the administration of justice.
See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7) (1982); Strickland & Moore, supra

note 57, at 133. This section of the Code has been highly influential, and most states incorporated verbatim Canon 3A(7) into their own codes of judicial conduct to allow a
judge in his or her discretion to permit camera access. See id.
Notably, in 1990 the ABA amended Canon 3 considerably, entirely deleting the section relating to cameras in the courts. See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3
(1990). The change was instigated by a belief that the question of camera access is not
closely related to judicial ethics and is more properly addressed by the administrative
rules adopted by each state. See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Report to the House of Delegates, Aug. 1990.
6 See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7) (1982).
64 See supra note 20 for a discussion of variations in state rules. See generally
Christo Lassiter, TV or Not TV - Statutory Appendix, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1002 (1996), for a comprehensive list of the rules and statutory guidelines employed by
different states.
6 See Lassiter, supra note 64, at 1007 n.24 (listing the states-Arizona, Colorado,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming-that permit a defendant to object to
the presence of the camera but allow the presiding judge to make the final decision regarding broadcast coverage).
6 See id. n.23 (highlighting the states-Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Maryland,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah-that do
not allow camera access in absence of a defendant's consent). For a discussion advocating that rules of professional conduct, rather than rules of camera access, should protect
the rights of a defendant, see Metz, supra note 22, at 695-96. Metz contends that "it is
important to realize that whether to allow cameras in the courtroom should be based more
on what laws and policies are in place to protect the rights of the accused versus the general public opinion." Id. at 700. Metz argues that instead of instituting an absolute ban
on camera coverage, the better approach would be for states to enact additional rules preventing lawyers from behaving "in a manner that they know or should know will materially prejudice the proceedings." Id. In this connection, Metz cites as an example the
new California rule regarding attorney professional conduct that was enacted as a direct
result of the O.J. trial. See id. at 695-96 & n.180; supra note 22 (delineating the rule).
As long as there are rules that protect the rights of the defendant, like the new California
rule, and are strictly enforced, Metz contends that a camera may be present during court
proceedings. See Metz, supra note 22, at 696, 701.
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cast media from the proceeding.' Demonstration of actual harm by a defendant is rarely successful, however, because of the typical absence of
tangible evidence of prejudice or bias."
II.

IMPACTS OF THE CAMERA ON COURTROOM PARTICIPANTS

A. JudicialDiscretion
Most state court systems that admit cameras also provide for judicial
discretion in making the final decision regarding access.' Consequently,
it is often the decision of one judge that determines whether a defendant's
face will be broadcast to the nation via television.' Leaving this impor-

67 See People v. Jackson, 920 P.2d 1254, 1292 (Cal. 1996) (finding that a defendant
must demonstrate "specific prejudice" caused by the camera's presence); People v. Wieghard, 727 P.2d 383, 386 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that the mere presence of the
camera did not by itself deny the defendant his due process rights); King v. State, 390 So.
2d 315, 318 (Fla. 1980) (holding that the defendant failed to show a denial of due process
caused by the presence of the camera); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 97, 103 (Fla. 1980)
(same); Commonwealth v. Cordeiro, 519 N.E.2d 1328, 1332 (Mass. 1988) (upholding
burden on defendant to prove "specific prejudice" standard); Commonwealth v. Cross,
605 N.E.2d 298, 300 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (proffering that a defendant could meet
the burden of showing "specific prejudice" if a judge were to instruct jurors to inform the
court if camera access would affect the jurors' impartiality); Stewart v. Commonwealth,
427 S.E.2d 394, 402 (Va. 1993) (holding admissible the presence of video cameras over
defendant's objections because defendant had failed to point to any "specific prejudice");
State v. Jessup, 641 P.2d 1185, 1194 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that defendant must
set forth specific evidence that the camera negatively affected the trial).
68 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 544 (1965) (noting that even though television
may cause prejudice, "one cannot put his finger on its specific mischief and prove with
particularity wherein he was prejudiced"); id. at 578 (Warren, C.J., concurring)
(discussing the almost impossible task of defendant proving harm); id. at 592 (Harlan, J.
concurring) (noting that the possibility for distortion of the integrity of the judicial process
may carry no telltale signs, but the effects may be considerably more deleterious and persuasive than actual physical disruptions); Valukas, supra note 28, at 21 (arguing that
camera effects are so subtle that they are "impossible to rectify when they do occur").
See the following cases, which exemplify the difficulty of proving injury because of the
camera: People v. Spring, 200 Cal. Rptr. 849, 854 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding no prejudice
to defendant due to presence of camera during trial); Williard v. State, 400 N.E.2d 151,
158 (Ind. 1980) (holding no prejudice to defendant even though the judge violated Indiana's Canon 3(A)(7), which bars cameras in the courtroom); Kansas City v. McCoy, 525
S.W.2d 336, 339 (Mo. 1975) (en banc) (holding that although a microphone present at
counsel table of defendant picked up conversation between defendant and his attorney, no
prejudice was incurred); State v. Smart, 622 A.2d 1197, 1206-07 (N.H. 1993) (finding
that televised coverage of defendant's notorious murder trial did not affect defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights).
6 See supranotes 62-65 and accompanying text.
' See Estes, 381 U.S. at 548. The Supreme Court could not overlook the potential
impact the camera may have on a defendant, noting that its mere presence could constitute a form of harassment. See id. at 549. To this end, the Court stated that a defendant

1558

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:1542

tant, and sometimes binding, decision in the hands of one individual allows for arbitrary results." This is readily apparent considering that
Judge Ito condoned the broadcast of the O.J. trial, while Judges Howard

and Weisberg, presiding over the trials of Susan Smith and the retrial of
the Menendez brothers respectfully, decided against camera access.'
Allowing a judge to decide whether a particular case is appropriate for
television viewing necessarily "singles out certain defendants and subjects them to trials under prejudicial conditions not experienced by others. " ' Indeed, it is arguably the "luck of the draw" that determines
whether a defendant will be exposed to the nation.74
Exacerbating this concern is the fact that although all judges pre-

sumably act with the best intentions, the members of the judiciary are
nonetheless vulnerable to the frailties common to most individuals.75 As
must be given his or her day in court and the opportunity to concentrate on the proceeding, undistracted by the camera. See id.
71 See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
72 Compare Christine Spolar, Judge Keeps Camera for Simpson Trial: Ito
Says He
Will Decide on Coverage of Pretrial Hearings on a Case-by-Case Basis, WASH. POST,
Nov. 8, 1994, at A14 (reporting Judge Lance Ito's belief that one stationary camera
would not jeopardize O.J. Simpson's right to a fair trial) with TV Barred in Drowning
Case, WASH. POST, July 1, 1995, at A2 (relaying Circuit Judge William Howard's contention that any broadcast of the trial of Susan Smith for the murder of her two sons
would interfere with due process and pose a risk to the trial proceedings in general); Ann
W. O'Neill & J.Michael Kennedy, Judge Bars Television Camerasfrom Courtroomfor
Menendez Retrial, L.A. TiMES, Oct. 7, 1995, at B1. Superior Court Judge Stanley Weisberg's decision to ban the camera was heralded by Deputy Public Defender Charles
Gessler, who represented Lyle Menendez. See id. at B3 Gessler had argued that the
camera would jeopardize his client's right to a fair trial by providing viewers with "free
entertainment" and reminding jurors of the pressure to convict the brothers of murder.
See id. In defense of his position not to permit broadcast coverage of the retrial of the
Menendez brothers, Judge Weisberg opined that television coverage would substantially
increase the risk that jurors would be exposed, even inadvertently, to commentary about
the brothers outside the courtroom. See id. at B1. The judge believed that potential exposure of this kind would prejudice the rights of the defendants as well as necessitate
hearings to investigate the impact of any exposure of the jury. See id.
7' Estes, 381 U.S. at 565 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
74 See Harvey J. Sepler, Where Do We Stand on Cameras in the Courtroom?, FLA.
B.J., June 1996, at 113 & n.5 (discussing a letter that Pete Wilson, Governor of California, wrote to Malcolm Lucas, then-Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California,
wherein Wilson commented that "where television and radio broadcasting can tum counsel, witnesses, and jurists into instant celebrities, it may simply not be appropriate to
leave this decision [whether or not to prohibit coverage in a particular case] in the hands
of the attorneys and the court who will benefit, no matter how well intentioned and conscientious they are.") (alteration in original) (footnote omitted); Torry, supra note 11, at 7
(relaying assertion of defense attorney that a judge other than the presiding judge should
be the one to decide the question of camera access).
75 See Estes, 381 U.S. at 548. As noted by Justice Harlan in a concurring opinion,
"who can say that . ..even a conscientious judge will not stray, albeit unconsciously,
from doing what 'comes naturally' into pluming themselves for a satisfactory television
'performance.'" Id. at 591 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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such, the Supreme Court has recognized that certain judges may, even
subconsciously, base their decision whether to allow camera access on
personal desires for fame and notoriety.7' Other judges may feel pressure
to succumb to media and public pleas to view the trial on television 77 and
allow camera access although they are aware of the complications the
camera may add to an already notorious trial.' Even more realistic is the
possibility that once certain judges, particularly state court judges who
are concerned with reelection,' allow the camera into the courtroom,
their resulting decisions will be tailored to invoke favorable public opinion.' Finally, some judges may permit camera access to prove to the

76 See id. at 548 (recognizing that because judges are "subject to the same psychological reactions as laymen," they also may be influenced by a desire for personal fame
or admiration); Wendy Kaminer, Cameras in the Courtroom: Should Judges Permit
High-Profile Trials to Be Televised - No: Tabloid Television Does Not Belong at Trial,

A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 37 (arguing that the presence of the camera may cause a judge
to play to the viewing audience).
77 See, e.g., Hoover, supra note 22, at A17 (relaying assertions of one Los Angeles
superior court judge that colleagues describe their courtrooms as "under siege" by the
broadcast media).
78 See Estes, 449 U.S. at 548-49 (highlighting that the camera would add significantly
to the burden of a judge who already has the difficult task of maintaining control in a
courtroom where the proceeding involves a well-known individual).
79 See Cossack, supra note 4, at 558-59 (contending that federal judges, because they
are not concerned with impressing the public, maintain better control of their courtrooms
than do state court judges, who are easier targets for public scrutiny).
80 See id. at 558 (highlighting the possibility that Judge Ito allowed the defense considerable leeway in the O.J. trial to counter any possible perceptions that the judge favors
the prosecution); Mary Wisniewski Holden, Opinions on Cameras in the Courts Keep
Changing Channels, Ci. LAW., Nov. 1996, at 16 (discussing various opinions on the
camera given at the Defense Research Institute's first annual meeting and highlighting
Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney Christopher Darden's opinion that the
camera affected Judge Ito who felt the need to "ben[d] over backwards to be fair"); J.
Stratton Shartel, Cameras in the Courts: Early Returns Show Few Side Effects, 7 INSIDE
LrrG. 1, 23 (1993) (contending that judges are concerned with how the public views their
rulings and this concern is exacerbated by camera access resulting in rulings that "may be
more popular than correct"); Betsy Streisand, And Justicefor All, U.S. NEws & WoRLD
REP., Oct. 9, 1995, at 50, 51 (recognizing that Judge Ito may ultimately be remembered
for his willingness to let the O.J. trial get out of control); Torry, supra note 11, at 7
(relaying defense attorney Abbe Lowell's opinion that the camera caused Judge Ito to
transform from "a tight-fisted judge" who maintained control of his courtroom to
"someone who cared about the public perception of fairness" above anything else); see
also Laurie L. Levenson, What Is the Real Reason the Simpson Defense Team Wants
Cameras in the Courtroom, O.J. Simpson Case Commentaries, Nov. 10, 1994, available
in 1994 WL 620920. Levenson contends that O.J. Simpson's defense team embraced the
admittance of the camera at their client's trial not for public interest or educational reasons but for tactical ones; i.e., the defense team believed that the camera would place additional pressure on the key players in the trial, namely the judge, to demonstrate to the
public at home that the defendant is being treated fairly. See id. at *1.
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public that a trial can be conducted with dignity and decorum in certain
courtrooms."1
B. JurorPrejudice
Relying substantially on various studies wherein jurors indicated
that the presence of the camera did not influence their decision making,'
s1 See Streisand, supra note 80, at 51 (reporting that since the beginning of the O.J.
trial, judges have surprisingly granted 47 out of 49 requests by Court TV to televise proceedings; seemingly, the judges are eager to prove to the public that their courtrooms can
facilitate justice); Torry, supra note 11, at 7 (relaying President of Court TV Steven
Brill's experience that some judges recently have "jumped at the chance" to have their
courtroom proceedings televised to prove to the public that a courtroom can be run properly and the O.J. trial was nothing but "an aberration").
s2 See Valukas, supra note 28, at 19-21. One survey conducted by Court TV in 1992
consisted of an informal questionnaire sent to judges who had experience with cameras in
their courtrooms. See id. at 20. Court TV conducted the experiment after the station had
televised 100 criminal and civil trials in 28 states as well as certain civil cases in federal
courts which had allowed for experimental access pilot programs. See id. All 70 judges
who responded to the survey declared that the presence of the camera had not hampered
the judicial process. See id. Moreover, 60% of the survey respondents believed that the
camera "helped convey the events of the trial in a way that contributed to public understanding of the legal system." Id.
The Federal Judicial Center conducted a similar study. See id. The Center's study
involved pilot programs adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1990.
See id. The programs were implemented from July 1, 1991 to June 30, 1993 in six district courts and two circuit courts of appeal. See id. In order to evaluate its findings the
Center relied on a number of sources, including telephone interviews with judges whose
courtrooms had contained cameras, questionnaires sent to judges and attorneys, discussions with media representatives, and reviews of studies analyzing the effects of the media coverage on witnesses and jurors. See id. The findings were reported as follows: (1)
judges looked more favorably at media coverage after experience with the program; (2)
judges and attorneys found that the presence of the camera caused little or no effect on
the participants in the courtroom; (3) members of the media cooperated and obeyed the
rules set forth by the court regarding the camera; and (4) most participants believed that
the camera had little or no effect on witnesses and jurors. See id. In light of these results, the Center recommended to the Judicial Conference that federal courts nationwide
allow camera access to civil proceedings, subject to certain guidelines to be promulgated
by the Judicial Conference. See id. For a brief summary of other studies regarding camera access, see Valukas, supra note 28, at 19-21.
Notably, however, the Federal Judicial Center admitted the limitations inherent
within its study. See id. at 20. For example, the following factors indicate the questionable validity of the study:
(1) the evaluation only included a measure of perceived (rather than actual)
effects on courtroom participants;
(2) the pilot program limited coverage to civil proceedings;
(3) the pilot courts were chosen from among courts that volunteered to
participate; and
(4) most of the analyses in the study focused on judges who actually had
experience with electronic media coverage and who may have reacted
more favorably than a randomly selected sample of judges.
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proponents of televised proceedings argue that camera access does not
impede a defendant's right to a fair trial.' Indeed, one such study found
that of the forty-eight states that conducted some form of investigation
regarding the influence of the camera, all but one state concluded that the
camera had little, if any, influence in the courtroom."
It is questionable, however, whether any of the studies conducted to
test the influence of the camera are scientifically valid.' The conclusions
pronounced are speculative at best because the studies begin with the assumption that jurors can objectively determine whether they have been
influenced by the camera.' As acknowledged by the Supreme Court,
"practical experience tells us" that jurors involved in a televised trial are
"preoccupied with the telecasting rather than the testimony.""' Even if
Hence, in light of these factors, the study could be deemed to include only judges who
were already proponents of cameras in the courtroom. See id.
3 See Krygier, supra note 4, at 83 (arguing that studies show no major negative effect on jurors and witnesses); Shartel, supra note 80, at 24-26 (outlining "reputable"
studies that purport to show that cameras do not adversely affect trial participants).
s4 See Christo Lassiter, Put the Lens Cap Back on Camerasin the Courtroom: A Fair
Trial Is at Stake, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1995, at 6 (conceding that studies conclude that the
camera had little or no influence on jurors' decisions, but questioning the validity of those
studies, especially those conducted prior to the reading of the O.J. verdict).
85 See Metz, supra note 22, at 697 (questioning the validity of studies because the
research does not take into account the fact that every trial situation is unique); Francis
Murphy, A Case Against Cameras in Courtrooms, N.Y. L.J., June 30, 1994, at 2
(reporting that the "alarming truth" is that the effect of the camera has never been comprehensively assessed and noting that studies conducted have been criticized for their
"statistical invalidity"); Shartel, supra note 80, at 24 (relaying the argument that few of
the numerous studies conducted are scientifically valid because the studies either are partisan or lack neutrality); Valukas, supra note 28, at 19-21. Valukas provides a brief synopsis of some notable studies and concludes that the studies lack scientific validity. See
id. The author explains that variables possibly affecting a defendant's right to a fair trial
are unquantifiable, thus causing the studies to be invalid. See id. at 21. Valukas further
concludes that his observations are largely intuitive, but contends that scientifically valid
evidence never would be available because the impact of camera access depends not on
the camera itself but on the actual proceedings and their participants. See id.
W See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 580-81 (1981) (noting that the impact of
televised trials remained to be seen); Associated Press v. Bost, 656 So. 2d 113, 114
(Miss. 1995) (contending that the camera will continue to be banned until the "benefits
and ramifications" of its presence have been extensively researched); Metz, supra note
22, at 696 (noting the difficulty inherent in evaluating camera impact because human behavior is unpredictable).
87 See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 581 (noting that the camera may have a significant impact on a juror, because the moment that a judge announces that a proceeding is to be
televised the proceeding is given new status and significance); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 546 (1965) (proffering that "distractions are not caused solely by the physical presence of the camera"; rather, "[i t is the awareness of the fact of telecasting that is felt by
the juror throughout the trial"). The Estes Court stated that this alone was enough to increase the chance of prejudice against a defendant, as "realistically it is only the notorious
trial which will be broadcast" and the jury, knowing that the proceeding will be viewed
by the community, will feel added pressure to perform. See 381 U.S. at 545.
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jurors are not distracted by the camera itself, the selection of a particular
trial for broadcast may influence the jurors' ability to arrive at an unbiased decision.s Thus, it is conceivable that jurors may become engrossed with their opportunity for fame as a result of sitting on a notorious televised trial and accordingly fail to scrutinize the evidence before
them." In addition, there is evidence that jurors may misperceive a trial
witness's reaction to the camera' or vary their own behavior in response
to the medium. 9 ' Finally, the camera may also impact jurors indirectly,
by affecting the duration of a trial,' the length of which directly affects

88 See Lassiter, supra note 84, at 8 (noting that trial notoriety can by itself influence a
juror because the camera lets the juror know that the trial is a celebrated one, and consequently places undue pressure on the juror, whose decision may become "politicized"
rather than unbiased).
89 See Ftes, 381 U.S. at 591 (Harlan, J., concurring) (asserting "who can say that
the juror who is gratified by having been chosen for a front-line case. . . will not stray,
albeit unconsciously, from doing what 'comes naturally' into pluming themselves for a
satisfactory television 'performance'"); see also Christopher Parkes, Trials of OJ May
Never End, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1997, at 4 (highlighting O.J. jurors who have authored
books, contracted to appear in movies, and demanded large fees to appear on television
shows); Simpson Trial ParticipantsStill Cashing In on Notoriety, OTTAWA CMZEN, Sept.
14, 1996, at A14 (discussing Playboy spread obtained by one O.J. juror and outlining
other incidents of trial participants securing lucrative business deals because of their participation in the O.J. proceeding).
90 See Shartel, supra note 80, at 23 (conveying the experience of a criminal trial attorney whose jurors "couldn't tell whether particular witnesses were nervous because of
the cameras or because they were lying").
91 See id. (relaying belief of Roy E. Black, William Kennedy Smith's attorney in
Floridav. Smith, that the camera affects a juror's ability to be honest, highlighting an experience with a juror who "blurted out" the truth of his feelings during voir dire only after the camera was turned off).
92 See Streisand, supra note 80, at 50 (reporting that the sequestration of the O.J. jury
for nine months was a California record); Cossack, supra note 4, at 557. Cossack contends that the verdict was influenced by the fact that the jury was sequestered for almost
one year, an unprecedented length of time. See id. The author contends that because the
forced separation of the jurors from their family and friends may have impacted the verdict, a compelling argument could be made that the camera should be excluded in a long
trial. See id. This conclusion is mandated, Cossack contends, because jurors need to
come to a verdict solely on the evidence heard, and not as a reaction to their frustration.
See id.; see also Joseph D. Steinfield & Robert A. Bertsche, Recent Developments in the
Law ofAccess, in COMM. LAW 1996, at 7, 39 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3980, 1996) (discussing Judge Hiroshi Fujisaka's decision to deny camera access to O.J.'s civil trial, naming as one of his
reasons the risk a televised trial would place on the unsequestered jury). Judge Fujisaka
stated that the "overwhelming pervasiveness" of the "intense coverage" of the O.J.
criminal trial led him to believe that he had a duty to prevent the probable exposure of the
unsequestered jury in the civil case. See Steinfield & Bertsche, supra, at 40. Seemingly,
allowing a trial to be televised may also necessitate the sequestration of a jury, which itself is obviously problematic. See Cossack, supra note 4, at 557.
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jurors' attitude, or motivate attorney "grandstanding,"

93

behavior that

may influence jurors as well.
C. Witness Prejudice
Witnesses are similarly vulnerable to the possible influences of the
camera." As evinced by the testimony of Kato Kaelin at the O.J. trial,
there is certainly some credence to the Supreme Court's prediction that a

proceeding could be prejudiced by a "'cocky' witness having a thirst for
the limelight" who becomes even "more 'cocky' under the influence of
television.""

Equally, if not more, troubling are witnesses who have

either sold their stories before testifying at trial' or witnesses who present testimony that is arguably skewed in order to invite further media attention.'

Conversely, the camera may have the effect of unnerving certain
witnesses who may become apprehensive

on the stand and who conse-

93 See Lassiter, supra note 84, at 8 (discussing the inevitable battle between opposing
counsel to tell their side of the story to the public when the camera is involved, rather
than give their full attention to the jury). But see Floyd Abrams, Cameras in the Courtroom: Should Judges Permit High-Profile Trials To Be Televised?- Yes: Cameras Reflect the Process,for Better or Worse, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 36 (arguing that the camera is not to blame for attorney grandstanding because such behavior is typical during
notorious trials); Hoover, supra note 22, at A17 (highlighting the arguments of camera
proponents that attorney showboating occurs regardless of the presence of the camera);
Metz, supra note 22, at 700 (contending that attorney grandstanding, which occurs even
in the absence of the media, is more to blame for the prejudices inflicted upon a defendant
than the camera).
94 See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
9 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 591 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
96 See, e.g., Sexy Willie's Social Whirl, N.Y. NEwsDAY, Jan. 31, 1992, at 4
(reporting that in the trial of William Kennedy Smith for date rape, the defense attorney
impeached the account given by a friend of the victim by revealing that the friend sold the
story to a local television show prior to testifying).
See, e.g., Streisand, supra note 80, at 50 (stating that several potential witnesses
for the O.J. trial did not take the stand because their "fever" for book deals and media
attention injured the reliability of their testimony); Lassiter, supra note 84, at 7. Lassiter
relays the situation of the shopkeeper who sold his story to the media before testifying at
a preliminary hearing about the sale of a knife to O.J. See id. The witness later spoke
with great conviction at trial, and subsequently landed a $12,000 appearance on a tabloid
talk show. See id. Lassiter remarks that television talk shows only pay guests for the
truth if the truth is "sensational" enough to warrant broadcast, and infers that if the witness had been less than convincing, the offer from the tabloid talk show would not have
been made. See id. Hence, Lassiter points out that the camera may cause witnesses to
manipulate or exaggerate their stories in such a manner so as to ensure themselves of a
few minutes of fame. See id.
gg See Murphy, supra note 85, at 2 (discussing the impression of jurors, impaneled
for the criminal trial of Joel Steinberg for the murder of his daughter, that the witnesses
were unnerved by the camera); Shartel, supra note 80, at 23 (relaying the account of a
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To the extreme, witnesses may

even express hesitance towards testifying at all, knowing that they will be

exposed to the nation via the camera.'0° At a minimum, it must be acknowledged that the impact of the camera is "incalculable," potentially
causing witnesses to over-dramatize or re-shape their testimony.'O°
D. Media Variable
Today, the Courtroom Television Network (Court TV) is the medium most readily identified with televised court proceedings." ° The
station is widely known and complimented for providing the first "gavel-

to-gavel" coverage of both criminal and civil trials conducted across the
nation.1 " Court TV began broadcasting in July 1991 and is most noted
for its broadcast of the OJ. trial.'04

criminal trial attorney whose witnesses appeared noticeably nervous on the stand in reaction to the camera).
99 See Shartel, supra note 80, at 23 (relaying a criminal trial attorney's experience
with one juror who told the attorney that he had not believed a witness because the witness appeared to be more concerned with how he looked in front of the camera than with
his actual testimony).
100 See, e.g., Smolowe, supra note 15, at 38. Smolowe reports that a witness in the
O.J. trial, Pablo Fenjves, has been the target of death threats and has been chased by
tourists because of the live coverage of the trial. See id. As a result, Fenjves does not
know if he would have testified if he had known the consequences. See id.; see also
Estes, 381 U.S. at 547 (noting the possible reluctance of witnesses to testify because of
the "mere fact" that the trial would be broadcast); Murphy, supra note 85, at 2
(highlighting account of two witnesses in the Joel Steinberg trial who expressed fear for
their safety because of the sensationalism of the trial).
101 See Estes, 381 U.S. at 547. The Court found that the potential for the impairment
of testimony from witnesses was strong. See id. The Court contended that in situations
where an individual is speaking publicly, there is a "natural tendency towards overdramatization," and therefore the accuracy of any given testimony by a witness who is
aware that he or she is on camera may be severely impaired. See id.; see also Valukas,
supra note 28, at 7 (arguing that the camera impacts the truth-finding process, because
"[a]s human beings, we all know that people act differently in front of a camera").
102 See Kristine Garcia, Court TV Hiu Five-Year Mark, ELEC. MEDIA, July 1, 1996, at
28, available in 1996 WL 7535184 (reporting that Court TV is profitable after five years
running, with 23.6 million subscribers and expansion onto the Internet).
103 See Kavanau v. Courtroom Television Network, No. 9lCiv.7959, 1992 WL
197430, at *1938 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1992). In 1992, Ted Kavanau, a 30-year veteran of
the cable and television industry, alleged that he originally thought of the idea for a
twenty-four hour cable station with a mainstay of live courtroom broadcasts throughout
the United States. See id. at *1939. He brought an action for damages against Court TV
and claimed relief against Court TV for theft of creation, unfair competition and misappropriation, unlawful and tortious interference with prospective economic retaliations and
advantage, and denial of business opportunity. See id. The court granted summary
judgment for Court TV upon the finding that Kavanau's idea was not a novel one. See id.
at *1944; see also Hart, supra note 21, at 5 (reporting that Steven Brill founded Court TV
in July 1991 after he was asked to develop a legal magazine and realized that televised
trial proceedings would be more "exciting" to the public); Scott Minerbrook, It's Court
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Once a judge decides to permit camera access in a particular matter,"1 Court TV ultimately determines whether the proceeding warrants
exposure on television." Indeed, when courts have expressed hesitation
in allowing televised coverage, the station has, in some cases, appeared
as an interested party on a motion to compel the court to allow access."°
Because of the commercial nature of Court TV, the station broadcasts
proceedings that are entertaining,"° so as to peak the public's interest and
curiosity, and thus generate profit.' Consequently, the public is not exTme, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP., July 15, 1991, at 16 (relaying how Steven Brill's idea
for Court TV came to him while riding in a taxi).
104 See Patricia Edmonds, The Moment, USA TODAY, Oct. 4, 1995, at A7 (reporting
that a record-breaking 8 out of 10 people watched television or listened to the radio to
learn the verdict); Anthony Scaduto, Flash! The Latest Entertainment News & More,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 7, 1997, at A10 (reporting that the O.J. trial is credited with giving Court
TV its fame). Court TV was not able to reap the same ratings for the civil trial of O.J.
Simpson, however, as all media was barred from the courtroom. See Linda Deutsch,
Judge Bans All Media from Simpson's Civil Trial, STAR LEDGER, Aug. 24, 1996, at AS;
Judge Bans Cameras, Video from Simpson Courtroom, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1996, at
A24 (reporting that Superior Court Judge Hiroshi Fujisaka decided that the media, in
every form from broadcast to still life sketch artists, would be denied access to the proceedings).
1o5 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing Canon 3A(7), implemented
by most states, which allows for judicial discretion in deciding camera access).
106 See David Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Television,
and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35 ARiz. L. REv. 785, 805
(1993). To aid in deciding which proceedings to televise, Court TV employs five criteria:
(1) the public interest in the case; (2) the notoriety and newsworthiness of the case and the
participants; (3) the caliber of the story; (4) the educational benefit of the case; and (5) the
probable duration of the case. See id.
1'7 See supra note 34 listing recent New York court proceedings wherein Court TV
made a motion to intervene to persuade the respective courts to allow the station to televise the proceeding.
108 See Massimo Calabresi, TIME, Jan. 10, 1994, at 56. Steven Brill, founder of Court
TV, has rejected criticism that the station televises only spectacular cases. See id. Court
TV, however, is "hardly shying away from the big cases," as it has televised the trials of
such notables as Lorena Bobbitt, Jeffrey Dahmer, William Kennedy Smith, and Lyle and
Erik Menendez. See id.; Frazier Moore, Court TV Presents Dirt with Dignity: Daily
Show Wraps It Up, RECORD, May 5, 1996, (TV & Cable) at 4 (quoting Gregg Jarrett, coanchor of Court TV, as contending that "[e]ntertainment is what a trial is all about"); see
also Jim McConville, Court TV Remakes Prime Tune: Looks to Strengthen Brand Identity
with Viewers, BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 20, 1996, at 60, available in 1996 WL
8290281 (discussing Court TV's attempt to produce a "faster format" in order to make its
programs "more watchable" and employing a "multimillion-dollar advertising campaign"
to promote its new schedule).
109 See Harris, supra note 106, at 801 (noting that while Court TV may in fact educate, its aim is to sell the products of its advertisers, and thus this goal will necessarily
determine in large part what the station chooses to televise); id. at 825 & n.295
(discussing Alan Dershowitz's suggestion that televised trials be run by non-profits organizations uninfluenced by profit motivation so there is no need to pick "flashy" cases).
But see Harris, supra note 106, at 801 n.129 (remarking that there is nothing inherently
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posed to the reality of every day courtroom procedure"'0 but, rather, is
primarily permitted to view only those proceedings deemed dramatic in
111
nature.

The necessity of trials televised by Court TV and other stations is
questionable; a brief review of Supreme Court precedent supports the
conclusion that the public's right of access would not be undermined if

the camera were barred from certain judicial proceedings."1
Camera
proponents nevertheless argue that the medium should be permitted because of its value to society as an educational tool.' The Supreme Court

wrong with the commercial nature of Court TV, but arguing that it is important to recognize that the station is "a profit-motivated, market-oriented organization").
11 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 548 (1965) (acknowledging that telecasters' decisions regarding what to televise will be dictated somewhat by the necessity of sponsorship, necessarily resulting in the televising of only the most notorious cases involving unpopular or famous individuals); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 752 F.2d
16, 23 n.10 (2d Cir. 1984) (relaying finding of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Judicial
Conference in response to media requests to televise trials that the "asserted public benefits of understanding and education" are "illusory since coverage is necessarily selective
and 'sensational'"); see also Harris, supra note 106, at 805 (discussing the fact that while
one of Court TV's criteria in selecting which trials to televise focuses on the importance
of the issue at bar, the case with the "better 'story,'" especially one involving celebrities,
will be the one chosen for the airways); Hart, supra note 21, at 5 (reporting that Court
TV concedes that trials are admittedly selected for broadcast'based on their notoriety or
controversy); Murphy, supra note 85, at 2 (asserting that Court TV primarily televises
only those cases that are especially lurid or involve a celebrity as a party).
1' See Calabresi, supra note 108, at 56 (relaying assertion of Harvard Law Professor
Alan Dershowitz that virtually all Court TV covers is "sex, gore and pornography");
Murphy, supra note 85, at 2 (noting Court TV's open admittance that it finances its televised trials by selling them as "a cross between C-Span and soap opera"); Moore, supra
note 108, at 4 (reporting the station's admittance that its shows are a form of entertainment, as exhibited by Court TV's pre-show commentary designed to intrigue potential
viewers--"Wl the tears of her spouse help convict her accused killer?").
112 See Part III infra discussing the public's right of access grounded in the First
Amendment.
113 See Harris, supra note 106, at 787 (pointing out that Court IV broadcasts
essentially unedited versions of trials, and thus permits the public to observe the judicial process); Minerbrook, supra note 103, at 16 (stating contention of Steven Brill, founder of
Court TV, that the station is equally as educational as it is commercial, because it provides information to the public about the least understood and most hidden branch of the
government---the court system); Patrick A. Tuite, 'No Cameras" Leaves Negaive Impression, Cm. LAw., July 1996, at 3 (contending that the public is entitled to information
about the judicial branch and noting that this lack of knowledge may be the motivating
factor behind jokes about lawyers). But see Estes, 381 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J., concurring) (acknowledging the educational value of television, which may "well provide the
most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying" information to the public, but
contending that an argument of this kind lacks constitutional dimension, because the
"rights to print and speak... do not embody an independent right to bring the mechanical facilities of the broadcasting ... into the courtroom").
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has admittedly recognized this argument as valid, noting the ability of
education to strengthen public confidence in the system." 4
The educational value of televised proceedings is undermined, however, because public perception is formed by watching courtroom drama
that is arguably atypical.' 5 And even if the broadcast is truly indicative

"4 See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1981) (noting the
Florida Supreme
Court's conclusion that allowing the public to view trials on television would "contribute
to wider public acceptance and understanding of decisions"); Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980) (opining that an open trial assists the public in
.understanding the system in general and its workings in a particular case" and thereby
increases confidence in the justice system). But see Estes, 381 U.S. at 544 (contending
that the "chief function of our judicial machinery is to ascertain the truth" and "television
: .. cannot be said to contribute materially to this objective" because it amounts to "the
injection of an irrelevant factor into court proceedings.").
Instead of boosting confidence in the system as the judiciary had anticipated that it
would, the presence of the camera has produced the opposite effect, now leaving the
public's opinion of the system in low regard. See, e.g., Don J. DeBenedictis, The National Verdict, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 52. The American Bar Association conducted
polls in 1994 and 1995 that revealed that the public's opinion of lawyers and of the judicial system in general has plummeted to a record low. See id.; Steven Keeva, Storm
Warnings, A.B.A. J., June 1995, at 77. The polls reported that by April 1995 nearly half
of the individuals questioned had lost confidence in the justice system. See Keeva, supra,
at 77. Hence, the argument that the television broadcast of trials "enhances, not hinders,
the administration of justice by fostering public confidence in the judicial process," Krygier, supra note 4, at 81, is unpersuasive. Indeed, since the advent of Court TV, many
individuals have instead expressed their dismay regarding the flaws of the system and the
behavior of lawyers in particular. See Keeva, supra, at 77.
11 See Harris, supra note 106, at 786, 821 (arguing that although Court TV promotes
a better understanding of the justice system the station also provides information that is
"often misleading and frequently wrong"). The ability of citizens to correctly assess the
policies underlying judicial decisions and the institutions implementing those policies depends on the dissemination of accurate information. See id. at 786. Therefore, erroneous
information directly affects an individual's view of the justice system, as well as his or
her ability to accurately critique that system. See id. Court TV injures the ability of society to informatively decide the behavior of the judicial system because its broadcasts
reflect "good entertainment" but do not honor the reality of the justice system. See id. at
827. Harris contends that this "flawed" picture of the judicial system is presented by
Court TV in certain respects. See id. at 788. First, Court TV's programming is based
almost exclusively on trials, which are themselves atypical of the legal system, because
the system resolves most conflicts without the necessity of a trial. See id. Second, because the station focuses on trials only, it presents an incomplete picture of the judicial
system, as the trial is only one small part of the system as a whole. See id. The public in
this manner remains ignorant to the true workings of the legal process. See id. Third,
because Court TV is the selector of the trials and is motivated by profit, the proceedings
televised "contain a larger than normal dose of weighty, topical issues, involve celebrities, lascivious detail, or grotesque or macabre trivia." Id. Hence, what is broadcast to
the public cannot be called a "true" and complete picture of the judicial system. See id.;
see also Calabresi, supra note 108, at 56 (reporting Alan Dershowitz's contention that the
"way Court TV does it is a bad idea" and the better approach would involve a nonprofit
channel that would provide the public with a broad range of issues); Tuite, supra note
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of conventional courtroom proceedings, commentary by the newscasters116 coupled with questionable camera focus may actually skew the accuracy of the broadcast."" Although it is true that Court TV has posi-

tively contributed to society by stimulating vigorous dialog on issues of
public concern,"' the crucial question still remains:

Is the overriding

purpose of the justice system to educate the public or to conduct fair proceedings? " 9
113, at 8 (proffering that there would be no harm either to the public or to the court if
judicial proceedings were televised on C-Span without sound bites or commentary).
Some argue that giving the public an inaccurate picture of the system may consequently result in a backlash to that system, as the public becomes disenchanted with the
present state of the law. See Cox, supra note 29, at A21. Cox predicts that increased
public cynicism is likely to lead to pressures to change the system in order to increase the
chance of more acceptable verdicts, focusing on court rules that do not allow for certain
publicized evidence to be presented to the jury. See id. Other possible consequences of
public dismay with the system are potential involvement of non-lawyers and opportunistic
politicians as would-be reformers, using the camera as a way of intensifying the "let's
hang-em" attitude. See id.; see also Streisand, supra note 80, at 47 (relaying the dismay
that the public will now "view the justice system through the prism of the O.J. Simpson
case" and noting to this end the results of a poll that revealed that one out of four members of the public now believe that there is no justice in America).
116 See Murphy, supra note 85, at 2. For example, Court TV once had to apologize
for remarks its broadcasters made after a defendant's testimony. See id. Murphy contends, however, that the damage sustained was irreparable, because the public was likely
to believe the commentators' remarks implying the defendant was a liar. See id. Indeed,
commentary during trials arguably analogizes court proceedings to sporting events, where
this type of play-by-play commentary is appropriate. See id. As aptly stated by Justice
Harlan in his concurring opinion in Estes:
[Alt its worst, television is capable of distorting the trial process so as to
deprive it of fundamental fairness .... interviews with the principal participants, commentary on their performances, "commercials" at frequent
intervals.., certainly such things would not conduce to the sound administration ofjustice by any acceptable standard.
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
17 See Murphy, supra note 85, at 2 (relaying the surprise of one juror
sitting on the
Joel Steinberg case who found that the Steinberg on television was significantly different
than the Steinberg sitting in the courtroom, because the televised version of the case focused on what appeared to be a constantly fidgeting defendant, who in fact was "calm"
and "dignified" throughout the proceeding, and thus portrayed the defendant in a "very
false" light).
115 See Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 660, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (permitting
camera access because of Judge Robert Ward's belief that television coverage was appropriate as it raised "profound social, political, and legal issues"); Harris, supra note 106,
at 787 nn.22-23 (noting important social issues such as acquaintance rape, domestic violence, and the insanity defense that Court TV helped bring to the public conscience). But
see Murphy, supra note 85, at 2 (stating that as a result of the televised William Kennedy
Smith trial, the number of reported rapes dropped dramatically because the real possibility of publicity frightened women who would otherwise have gone to the police).
19 See Hoover, supra note 22, at A18 ("The purpose of [a] trial is not to educate the
public about anything"); Lassiter, supra note 84, at 11 (recognizing that the "purpose of
the court is not education or not spectacle or public entertainment, but justice"); see also
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E. Privacy of the Participants
One of the elementary rights of every individual is the right to pri-

vacy.'i

The public has an equally well-established right of access to

trial, implicitly guaranteed by the First Amendment. 121 The press is also
granted this access right and has an arguably greater interest in attending

judicial proceedings because the goal of the press is to inform the public." Accordingly, a judge may restrict the access of the press only in
extreme circumstances and. normally must permit the media to attend
courtroom proceedings." Added to this complex bundle of rights is the
entitlement of a defendant to an open court proceeding pursuant to the
Sixth Amendment."
There is a resulting inherent conflict between the rights of trial participants and the public." Augmenting this conflict is the fact that trial
participants have varying degrees of privacy expectations. Certain indi-

viduals are expected to endure close scrutiny by the media because they
are deemed "public officials.""

Similarly, other participants must forgo

Estes, 381 U.S. at 540 (stating that "[clourt proceedings are held for the solemn purpose
of endeavoring to ascertain the truth"); id. at 588 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that
under the Sixth Amendment a "fair trial is the objective, and 'public trial' is an institutional safeguard for attaining". that right granted to a defendant); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 24 n.13 (2d Cit. 1984) (highlighting the fact that
.courts,... are at most only secondarily institutions to foster public debat... [and] exist primarily to adjudicate legal controversies").
12 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (right of privacy); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479" 485 (1965) (same); see also Marijo A. Ford & Paul A. Nembach, Note, The Victim's Right to Privacy: Imperfect Protectionfrom the Criminal Justice System, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 205, 208 n. 10 (1992) (listing state statutes
codifying the constitutionally found right to privacy).
121 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
12 See id. at 572-73 (holding that the media, in its role as "surrogate" for the public,
adequately protects the public's right of access).
123 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (noting that
"the circumstances under which the press and public can be barred from a criminal trial
are limited; the State's justification in denying access must be a weighty one.").
124 See Ford & Nembach, supra note 120, at 207 (noting the inevitable conflict of interest between the rights of a defendant and the rights of a victim).
'" See id. at 209-10 & n.12 (highlighting difficulty of finding the level of privacy afforded'to a victim in a criminal case, as neither the Supreme Court nor state courts have
provided any meaningful guidelines).
126 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 & n.23 (1964).
The
Court held that in a defamation action a public official may not recover damages for
falsehoods made against him without proving by "convincing clarity" that the statement
made by the media about him was made with "actual malice." See id. at 283, 285-86. In
New York Tunes, L.B. Sullivan, the plaintiff alleging a cause of action for defamation,
was an elected Commissioner of the City of Montgomery, Alabama. See id. at 256. Although the Court did not specify those persons who would be considered public officials,
the Court considered Sullivan to be a "public official" because he was an elected official
of a city. See id. at 283 n.23. Sullivan complained that he had been libeled in a newspa-
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certain privacy rights as they are categorized as "public figures" due to
their individual fame or notoriety." Individuals who would not normally
be termed public figures may temporarily suffer privacy invasions because of their voluntary joinder in a public controversy. 1" Most individuals, however, who are ordinary private citizens," are not accusper advertisement that was carried by the New York Tunes describing the civil rights
movement and appealing for donations. See id. at 256. The advertisement referred to the
police in a negative manner by implying that the police had tried to intimidate Dr. Martin
Luther King. See id. at 257-58. Sullivan contended that the references made in the advertisement to "police" and "they" actually referred to him. See id. at 258.
12 Two companion cases decided by the Supreme Court outline the "public figure"
definition. The first, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), involved the
athletic director of the University of Georgia, Wally Butts, who had earned a national
reputation as the previous head football coach of the university. See id. at 135-36. Butts
had initiated an action against the press after it had printed an article that alleged Butts
had conspired to fix a football game held between the University of Georgia and the University of Alabama. See id. at 136-37.
The second case, Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), involved a private citizen, Edwin Walker, who had gained national prominence as a result of a distinguished military career. See id. at 140. He had filed a complaint for defamation against
the press after it had printed an article asserting that Walker had taken charge of a large
crowd that had rioted on campus in opposition to school desegregation measures and encouraged the group to resort to violence. See id. at 140-41.
The Court found in Butts and Walker that "public figures" should be held to the
same strict standard established for public officials in New York Tines, because although
public figures are not public officials, they nevertheless are "intimately involved in the
resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas
of concern to society at large." Id. at 164 (Warren, J., concurring). Therefore, the
Court reasoned that because public figures have access to the media they can address
and/or counter any criticisms assailed against them. See id. at 155.
128See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). The Gertz Court distinguished between a "public figure for all purposes"; i.e., when an individual has
achieved pervasive fame or notoriety, and a "public figure for a limited range of issues;"
i.e., when an individual has injected himself into a particular controversy. See id. In either case, however, both are held to the strict public officiallNew York Tunes standard
because such individuals are deemed to "assume special prominence in the resolution of
public questions." Id. Gertz was a Chicago -attorney who was representing a family in a
civil action whose minor son was killed by a police officer. See id. at 325. The American Opinion, a monthly paper that published the views of the John Birch Society, alleged
that Gertz had communist affiliations as well as a criminal record. See id. at 325-26.
The paper also alleged that Gertz was involved in a conspiracy in an attempt to frame a
police officer. See id. at 326. Gertz was active in community affairs and well known as
an attorney, but was still not deemed a "public figure" because he had achieved no real
fame or notoriety. See id. at 351-52.
The camera, notably, might have changed the outcome in Gertz. Clearly, an attorney involved in a similar case today could become quite well known if portrayed over the
television airways. He or she would thus achieve the fame Gertz had not, and therefore
be deemed a "public figure."
12 See id. at 344. The Court found that private individuals are distinguishable from
public figures because they are more vulnerable to criticism and more susceptible to injury, and therefore compel greater protection by the state. See id. Conversely, the individual who decides to seek election to government office does so with the knowledge that
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tomed to any media infringement on their personal lives and thus do not
have a lesser expectation of privacy.13
These private citizens are of primary concern because their privacy
rights are dictated by the variations apparent in different state court access rules. As discussed supra in Part I, certain state courts do not allow
trials of a sensitive nature to be televised, going to great lengths to protect the privacy rights of individuals."' Other state courts seemingly find
privacy rights less compelling, and limit the camera narrowly, merely
forbidding focus on either witnesses 1" or jurors.3 At the extreme are
his life will thereafter be subject to public scrutiny. See id. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has also found the public figure responsible for her privacy loss, because she has forced
herself to the "forefront of particular public controversies" and therefore has "invit[ed]
attention and comment." Id. at 345.
130 See Edward J. Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court
Justice and the Philosopher,28 RUTGERs L. REv. 41, 54 (1974) ("In [public disclosure]
cases the individual has been profaned by laying a private life open to public view. The
intimacy and private space necessary to sustain individuality and human dignity has been
impaired by turning a private life into a public spectacle. The innermost region of being.
has been bruised by exposure to the world.") (footnote omitted).
131 See supra note 20 and accompanying text; Lassiter, supra note 64, at 1011 &
nn.37-38 (listing states-Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, and Ohio--that allow a judge to ban the camera for that portion
of the trial involving testimony by the victim).
132 See Lassiter, supra note 64, at 1013 & nn.60-61 (listing states--Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah- that prohibit the televising of witnesses or at a minimum lessen the invasion of privacy); see also Torry, supra note 11, at F7. Jon 0.
Newman, Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, is concerned that a witness should never be
televised involuntarily; Judge Newman is quoted as stating that "[l[t's outrageous to give
a witness the notoriety that comes from instant nationwide recognition." Id.
113 See Elizabeth Gleick, Did He or Didn't He?, TIME, Feb. 6, 1995, at
56 (noting an
incident during the O.J. trial where a Court TV cameraman mistakenly televised the face
of an alternative juror); Harris, supra note 106, at 803 n.152 (pointing out that some
states allow the jury to be televised, while others forbid the camera to focus on jurors, or
only allow jurors to be televised in "background shots"); Hoover, supra note 22, at Als
(relaying Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Mary Ann Murphy's experience that the media has repeatedly disobeyed orders barring them from televising victims or defendants,
and consequently has "alarmed jurors who want their privacy preserved"); Lassiter, supra note 64, at 1110-11 & nn.32-35 (listing various rules employed by states to minimize
intrusions on juror privacy, noting that the current trend is to electronically blur juror
faces to hide identify).
Juror privacy may become a volatile issue when the camera is present, as courtroom
access is typically open to the public during jury questioning, and often exposes the jury
to privacy invasions as a result of attorney inquiry into the jurors' personal lives. See,
e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press-EnterpriseI).
The issue in Press-EnterpriseI involved the voir dire, or questioning of a jury, which
necessarily revolves around personal issues relating to the jurors. See id. at 512. The
lower court had ordered the doors to the courtroom closed in light of the potential for invasions of privacy. See id. at 513. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the order,
finding that the lower court had not considered fully the alternatives to closure. See id.
The Court conceded that the interrogatories to the potential jury may necessitate a discus-
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those state courts that permit live telecasts even where the defendant"' or
victim'"5 objects. Concededly, privacy invasion is an unfortunate but
necessary result of the judicial system that is warranted due to the overriding concerns of a defendant's right to a fair trial. The addition of the
camera into the courtroom, however, unnecessarily exacerbates this privacy intrusion by apathetically exposing the average citizen to the nation
via television."
III. BROADCAST MEDIA ACCESS--AN ISSUE OF FIRST AMENDMENT
CONCERN?

The seminal case providing the basis for public access to trials is
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.13 Prior to this case, the Supreme Court in Gannett v. DePasquale had decided that the public did
not have a right of access to pre-trial motions. 3 Because the Gannett
sion of personal matters, but found that the privacy rights of the individuals in question
may have been preserved without absolutely prohibiting access to the proceeding. See id.
134 See supra note 67 and accompanying text (listing cases in states that allow televised
proceedings over the objection of the defendant).
13s See Ford & Nembach, supra note 120, at 220 n.78 (listing cases wherein the victim
requested that the courtroom be closed due to the sensitive aspects of the case but -was
denied closure due to the overriding concern of a defendant's right to a fair and open
trial). Typically it is the victim in a given proceeding who is most concerned with privacy invasions, and who therefore requests. that the courtroom be closed. The victim's
privacy interest, however, only overrides the public's right of access and the defendant's
right to an open trial if the victim demonstrates the existence of an "overriding interest
that is likely to be prejudiced." Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984). To date, no
litigant has satisfied this burden. See Ford & Nembach, supra note 120, at 222.
13
See Lassiter, supra note 84, at 11. In connection with a discussion of the privacy
rights of the victim, and in.particular the William Kennedy Smith rape trial, Lassiter contends that "[t]he humiliation of parading an alleged rape victim's. undergarments in a
courtroom... is a necessary part of the judicial process. Further humiliation by making
such evidence the fare of national television may make for fair commercial television, but
does it make for a fair trial?" Id.
131 448 U.S. 555 (1980).!
'm See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). Gannett involved an appeal
to the United States Supreme Court of an order that excluded the public as well as the
press from a pre-trial motion to suppress alleged involuntary confessions by the defendants. See id. at 375-77. The trial court had determined that the publicity regarding the
confessions might jeopardize the defendants' right to a fair and impartial trial. See id. 'at
392-93. The Supreme Court upheld the order, noting that although there was a strong
societal interest in a public trial, the Sixth Amendment guarantee serves to protect an individual defendant from possible prejudicial factors that may injure his right to an unbiased verdict. See id. at,383. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment did not give the
public or the press the right of access to .a pre-trial hearing, and emphasized that "a
heaing... is not a trial." Id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., concurring). But see notes 153-59
and accompanying text discussing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (PressEnterprise 11) where the Court relayed situations where the public may be permitted access to pre-trial hearings.
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Court had not determined whether the public had a right of access to

trial,I" Richmond was considered a case of first impression. 40
The defendant in Richmond was initially convicted of second-degree
murder, a judgment later reversed due to an evidentiary error.'

1

Two

2

subsequent trials ended in mistrials.
At the onset of the fourth trial for
the murder charge, the defendant requested that the proceedings be closed
to the public." The Supreme Court heard the case on a writ of certiorari, and prefaced the opinion by noting that both criminal and civil trials
have historically been open to the public.'" The Court first highlighted
the notion that the open trial system is an integral part of American soci-

ety.'" Recognizing, however, that the right to trial access is not specifically granted in the Constitution,"

the Court began its analysis by ex-

amining the basis for the claim.

9
14o
141
'42

See id. at 392 n.24.
See
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 559 (1980).
See Richmond
id.
See id.
See id. at 559-60.

'44 See id. at 580 n.17. To this end, the Court discussed the long-standing tradition of
the public trial and its importance to the functioning of the judicial system in American
history. See id. at 564-68; see also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (holding
that because a trial is considered to be a public event, the events that transpire there are
public property).
'4' See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 568. The Court found that the opportunity of citizens
to attend was deemed to be an "indispensable attribute" of the American system of justice. See id. To this end, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the openness of a trial assures that the proceedings are conducted in a fair manner, discourages any misconduct or
inclinations towards perjury, and, most importantly, facilitates decisions based not on
partiality or bias but on facts and evidence. See id. at 569. Moreover, the Justice highlighted the "therapeutic value" the public trial provides and explained that when a community is exposed to a shocking crime, the open process of justice serves an "important
prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion"
as well as assisting the public in "understanding the system in general and its workings in
a particular case." Id. at 570-71. The Court further expressed the idea that the effect of
public attendance strengthens the confidence in judicial remedies and increases the respect for the law, an essential ingredient to a democratic society. See id. at 572.
146 See id. at 579. The Court acknowledged that this right of access to trial is not explicitly stated in the First Amendment or anywhere else in the Constitution. See id. The
Court noted, however, many other rights that have been deemed to be granted by the
purpose and wording of the Constitution when taken as a whole, even though these rights
are nowhere specifically mentioned in the text. See id. at 579-80 & 580 n.16 (citing
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right of privacy); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel between states); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (right of privacy); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (right of association)).
Moreover, the Court has viewed the Bill of Rights as having certain
"penumbras"; i.e., rights that are not explicitly mentioned but that logically follow from
the rights specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.

1574

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:1542

Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality of the Court, found that
the First Amendment must be broadly construed to give full meaning to
enumerated rights.147 To this end, the Court declared that an absolute
"closed-door" policy banning public access to trial would be unconstitutional, as such a ban would eviscerate important rights encompassed by
the freedoms of speech and press. 141
Although the Richmond Court declared that the right of access is

necessary for full expression of enumerated rights, the Court was explicit
in stating that access is not absolute and may be restricted. 49 Pertinent to
the majority's reasoning was its finding that the public's right of access is
sufficiently protected by the press." ° Because this role of the press is

deemed to be of primary importance, the Chief Justice noted that the
press should be given preferential
access in situations where spectator
15
interest exceeds seating capacity. 1
The Richmond Court pronounced the rule barring mandatory closure

to trial. 52 The Supreme Court has since expanded this rule in its most
recent decision on access, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court."

In

Press-Enterprise,Chief Justice Burger held that a qualified right of access under the First Amendment attaches to those judicial proceedings
that satisfy two complementary considerations.15 First, the proceeding
must historically have been open to both the press and the public.15 Second, the proceeding must be one that is positively enhanced by public involvement."s The majority noted, however, that access may be denied if
147 See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 580. In this vein, the Court noted that it had previously
held that freedom of the press could not properly be exercised without the necessary corresponding access to issues of public importance. See id. at 576-77.
148 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
'49 See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18.
150 See id. at 572-73.
151 See id. at 573.
152 See id. at 581; see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S.
596, 606
(1982). The Globe Newspaper Court noted that under Richmond the right of access is not
absolute, but held that the circumstances where the press and public can be barred are
limited. See id. Accordingly,"[w]here... the State attempts to deny the right of access
in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial
is necessitated by a compelling government interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." Id. at 606-07 (citations omitted). In Globe Newspaper, the Court invalidated a
Massachusetts law requiring the exclusion of the press and the public during proceedings
involving sex crimes when the victim testifying is under eighteen. See id. at 602.
15' 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-EnterpriseII).
'54 See id. at 8.
155 See id.
'3" See id. at 9. Press-Enterprise11 involved the right of access to the transcript of a
preliminary hearing in a criminal case. See id. at 3. The California Supreme Court declared that the right of access to criminal trials did not extend to preliminary hearings.
See id. at 5. The Supreme Court conversely found that preliminary hearings were his-
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a court determines that publicity may injure the rights of the accused or
negatively affect other court participants. 157 Denial of access is mandated, though, only when courtroom "closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."'

Because

the lower tribunal did not record specific findings outlining the need for
closure and did not consider alternatives to absolute closure, the Supreme
Court found the denial of access unwarranted in Press-Enterprise.59
As exemplified by the Supreme Court decisions discussed herein, it
is clear that the rationale for the right of access to court proceedings is to

ensure that the public is adequately informed and to guarantee the fair
administration of justice. 1" Indeed, this two-pronged interpretation complements the rationales for the First Amendment:

to perpetuate the

search for truth by inflating the "marketplace of ideas," 1 61 to aid individuals in their own self-governance, 1" and to keep government power in
check."6 Hence, in accordance with Supreme Court precedent and estabtorically, and presumptively, open to the public. See id. at 10. Noting to this end its past
decision in Gannett wherein the closure of a preliminary hearing was upheld, the Court
declared that precedent dictated that a courtroom be closed only upon a showing of "good
cause." See id. at 11. See supra note 138 for a discussion of Gannett. The Court recognized that preliminary hearings held in California were extensive in scope and quite
similar to a trial, and thus found that public access to such hearings would ensure their
proper functioning. See Press-Enterprise11, 478 U.S. at 12-13.
157 See Press-EnterpriseII, 478 U.S. at 9 & n.2.
ld. at 9.
I5
"'
See id. at 14.
16 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the
sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become
known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal
trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the
system.
Id. (citation omitted).
161 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
[When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
16 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEoHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT, 25-27 (1948) (contending that all members of society, who are essentially
potential voters, must be made as informed as possible so they are better able to advocate
public policy and decide issues in a competent manner).
163 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (stating that the "major purpose of [the First Amendment] was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs"); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527 (asserting that the rationale behind the protection of free speech
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lished First Amendment theories, courtrooms are only closed to the public in extreme circumstances.'"
In this regard, when discussing the public's right to access for informational and self-governing purposes, it should be clear that
"'[p]ublic interest,' taken to mean curiosity, must be distinguished from
'public interest,' taken to mean value to the public of receiving information of governing importance."6 In other words, there simply is not a
First Amendment right "to satisfy public curiosity and publish lurid gossip about private lives.""6 Conversely, a First Amendment right to be
well-informed on issues of public concern is clear. 67

Under the present system, the argument that camera access is an issue of First Amendment concern must fail. Because, by definition, the
right of access encompasses only issues of public concern, the camera
should not reach information of a more private nature." Yet as a result
of the commercial nature of televised judicial proceedings today, the
camera focuses not on issues protected by the First Amendment but on
trials that often transform the courtroom from a tribunal of justice to a
talk show studio. Exemplifying this problem is the primary desire of the

"is the value that free speech.. . can serve in checking the abuse of power by public officials").
164 See, e.g., Press-EnterpriseI, 478 U.S. at 15 (noting that a defendant must show
more than the mere risk of prejudice from publicity to overcome the public's right of access, and even upon such a showing, any limitation on the public's right of access must
be narrowly tailored); Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)
(acknowledging that only in limited circumstances will courtroom access be denied to the
press and the public).
16s Bloustein, supra note 130, at 56-57 (footnotes omitted).
166 See id. at 57; see also Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to
Tune: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L.
REV. 935, 962 (1968) (contending that "speech necessary for an effective and meaningful
democratic dialogue by and large does not require references to the intimate activities of
named individuals").
167 See supra note 115 and accompanying text discussing the importance of an educated public.
168 See Lassiter, supra note 84, at 10 (arguing that "[tihe public's right to know, so
very persuasive with respect to the executive and legislative branches, has less sway
when applied to the judicial branch"). Because trials seem to concentrate primarily on
the personal lives of individuals rather than on government abuse, courts routinely require disclosure of very intimate details of a defendant's life. See id. In this respect, the
camera invades an individual's privacy even further by graphically exposing matters of
private concern not only to courtroom viewers but also to all who may watch the proceeding at home. See id. While the press often omits personal, intimate details that have
no real bearing on the legal aspects of the case, the "unblinking camera has no discretion
and no modesty." Id.
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public not to be informed in areas of legitimate legal procedure, but
rather to be entertained.' 0
Moreover, even if the information disseminated by the camera involved only issues of public concern, the need for cameras in the courtroom is still questionable. It is axiomatic that the right to information is
useless unless there is a corresponding opportunity to receive and have
access to that information.17° The camera, however, is an unnecessary
means of fulfilling this corollary right. Now, more than ever, the press
provides the public with information in a manner so efficient that it dispels any need for live television coverage.171 Indeed, recent advancements in the multimedia sector allow many trial enthusiasts to be connected "on-line" via the Internet, where they can immediately view the
results of trial proceedings as disseminated by the reporters attending
these events." In light of the many information alternatives offered to
the public, alternatives that are inherently less intrusive than the camera,
the argument for live televised broadcasts accordingly fails.' " Similarly,
169 See, e.g., Ginia Bellafante, Soap Operas: The Old and the Desperate,
TIME, May
29, 1995, at 73 (noting that since Court TV began broadcasting the O.J. trial, the ratings
for the top three soap operas, The Young and the Restless, All My Children, and General
Hospital, dropped by more than ten percent); Richard Corliss, It's Already the TV Movie,
TIME, July 18, 1994, at 36 (highlighting the public's "strange taste in atrocities" and tendency to ignore important social issues while remaining fascinated by gossip); James
McConville, Down IsUp for Cable Networks, Broadcasting & Cable, Oct. 30, 1995, at
51, available in 1995 WL 7940318 (reporting a significant drop in the ratings of Court
TV, E!, and CNN's Geraldo Rivera Live since the reading of the O.J. verdict); Scaduto,
supra note 104, at A10 (reporting that Court TV is "pulling the plug" on its syndicated
program "Court TV: Inside America's Courts" because of low ratings).
1V See Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (asserting that the opportunity to receive information is vital to the guarantee
of free speech); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) ("without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated").
171 See Lassiter, supra note 84, at 10-11 (arguing that the press adequately covers
court proceedings even after omitting irrelevant information, while the camera lens does
not "blink" and, therefore, broadcasts personal facts unnecessary to the education of the
public); Valukas, supra note 28, at 21. Modern press coverage of judicial proceedings is
so advanced that the considerations underlying open trials are sufficiently accommodated
without live television coverage. See id. Today, the sophistication of the press is such
that daily transcripts are routinely available and the media is granted access to most courtroom proceedings. See id. Arguably, then, "it is open to serious debate whether the
public's 'right to know' and its ability to monitor judicial proceedings materially is affected by the absence of live television coverage." Id.
172 See Jon Kerr, Cyberspace Huns with Discussion of Communications Decency Act
Case, WEST's LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL 259710 (discussing the
fact that although there was no direct on-line access to the O.J. trial, enthusiasts followed
the case via on-line reports by correspondents covering the proceedings).
173 See Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 22 (2d Cir. 1984)
The court noted that the right of access to information requires the corollary right to receive that information, but asserted that "[nlo case.., has held that the public has a right
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the absence of the camera cannot be said to hinder the assurance of justice because both the public and the media have sufficient access to most
court proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION

As Justice Harlan stated in his oft-cited concurring opinion in Estes:
[Tihe day may come when television will have become so commonplace an affair in the daily life of the average person as to dissipate all
reasonable likelihood
that its use in courtrooms may disparage the ju174
process.
dicial
Many argue that that day has come. The variations in state court
access rules, however, are troublesome because the differences tread
upon a fundamental right granted by the United States Constitution - the
right to a fair trial. Because the Supreme Court in Chandlerdid not create a standard regarding camera access, state courts have been left to
their own devices. As a result, some state tribunals broadly construe a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right while others narrowly interpret the
liberty. Augmenting this disturbing consequence is the absence of any
concrete data evidencing that a defendant is unharmed by the presence of
the camera.
Hence, the present system essentially allows some individuals to be
open to potential punishment from the camera while others are shielded
by chance of judicial discretion. Defendants who are not famous or
newsworthy are arguably granted further protection, as the media will
most likely not deem their trial broadcast-worthy. In this regard, the Supreme Court clearly voiced its concern that factors such as "the nature of
the crime and the status and position of the accused-or of the victim"
would dictate which proceedings are broadcast, resulting in television
that may serve to "titillate rather than to educate and inform."75 Until
that concern is adequately vitiated, the "thirteenth juror" should remain
outside the courtroom.
Melissa A. Corbett

to televised trials." Id. The Westmoreland court dismissed the media's argument that the
public's right to access was "wholly diluted" if not extended to broadcast coverage. See
id. at 23. The court instead found that the right was adequately upheld through the public's ability to review trial proceedings through the newspaper and television news. See
id.
174 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 595 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
15 See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 580 (1981).

